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SPARE THE ROD, EMBRACE 
HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW'S 
MANDATE AGAINST ALL 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF 
CHILDREN 
SUSAN H. BlTENSKY· 
If your adult neighbor engaged in annoying or objectionable be-
havior, would you hit him? Probably not. What if that neighbor had less 
than average adult physical or mental abilities? Given his relative vul-
nerability, you would be even less likely to "knock" some sense into 
him. And, if you loved that neighbor as if he were a family member, 
hitting him would seem a downright bizarre way of dealing with the 
situation. Now, imagine that the offender is your child-typically a 
person of less than average adult abilities and a person whom you love 
as a family member. Would you hit him?1 Many American parents 
would do so with the conviction that responsible child rearing requires 
no less. 
Many adults were spanked as children, and most American chil-
dren continue to be spanked.2 It is generally assumed in our society that 
parents, and in some jurisdictions, teachers, should be able to spank 
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law, J.D., 
University of Chicago Law School (1974); B.A., Case Western Reserve University 
(1971). 
1. Cf Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New 
Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
353,435 (1998) (setting forth a similar hypothetical problem). 
2. Jd. at 354, 355 & n.3. 
147 
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children as a corrective or educational measure-as long as the spank-
ing does not rise to the level of child abuse as traditionally conceived.3 
This assumption owes much of its vitality to the role of law: forty-nine 
states permit parents to use "reasonable" corporal punishment on their 
offspring,4 arid approximately half of the states permit educators to do 
the same to students.5 Indeed, in Ingraham v. Wright,6 the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled in 1977 that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to the paddling of 
students by school personnel.7 
Does this normative and legal context mean that you should an-
swer my hypothetical question in the affirmative? €ould something so 
commonplace, and legally acceptable to boot, be wrong? What, after 
all, is the big deal? We're not talking genocide or the rack. A smack or 
two on a toddler's bottom is not exactly a human rights issue, is it? 
True. Spanking is not genocide or the rack. But, pain is pain, harm 
is harm, and unfair treatment is unfair treatment, especially when the 
victim is as small, weak, and helpless as children tend to be in compari-
son to adults. Imagine the situation from the child's perspective. An 
adult upon whom she is utterly dependent, and whom she desperately 
wants to love, looms on the child's horizon glowering, threatening; 
Fear and panic grip the child. Then comes the blow-a blow that hurts 
the body and mortifies the ego. But there is nothing that the child can 
do to palliate the pain and indignity. There is no recourse against this 
exercise of raw power. You see, once we look at things from children's 
viewpoint and empathize with children as full-fledged human beings 
capable of being wounded in body and soul, logic inexorably drives us 
to the realization that corporal punishment is experienced by children in 
the same way that other human rights violations are experienced by 
adults. 
To be less impressionistic and more analytical, corporal punish-
ment of children is a human rights issue for three reasons. First, corpo-
ral punishment hurts. By definition, spanking is intended to cause pain 
as a way of controlling, modifying, or punishing a child's conduct.s 
3. [d. at 358 & n.7. 
4. [d. at 355, 356 & n.5. 
5. [d. at 355 & n.4. 
6. 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (5-4 decision). 
7. [d. at 664. 
8. See JAMES DOBSON, THE STRONG-WILLED CHILD: FROM BIRTH THROUGH 
ADOLESCENCE 47 (1978); 1. RICHARD fuGATE, WHAT THE BIBLE SAYS ABOUT ... 
CHILD TRAINING 136 (1980); PHILIP GREVEN, SPARE THE CHILD: THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS 
OF PUNISHMENT AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF PHYSICAL ABUSE 122-23 (1991); 
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Corporal punishment is intended to cause pain based on the premise 
that the discomfort itself will induce the child to alter bad behavior.9 
For the corporal punisher, pain is indispensable to correcting behavior. 
Torturers proceed upon the same assumption: pain is essential to ex-
tracting information or intimidating the opposition. Such intentional 
infliction of pain is the very stuff of which human rights violations are 
made.lO Worse still, its use to correct children is specious. Most child 
care experts agree that spanking does nothing to further the main disci-
plinary goals of developing the child's conscience and preference for 
peaceful conflict resolution; in contrast, reasoning with the child and 
nonviolent punishments such as deprivation of privileges are regarded 
as much more effective for these purposes.ll 
Second, corporal punishment of children is a human rights issue 
because such punishment causes serious harm, even beyond inflicting 
pain, both during childhood and later in the victim's life. As an inva-
sion of their bodily integrity, children experience corporal punishment 
with a sense of degradation and humiliation. 12 Such suffering is com-
pounded by the fact that children are helpless to alleviate their situa-
tion. An adult who is smacked can vent his anger by smacking back or 
calling the police. A child who is smacked usually has no option but to 
repress his anger--either because he cannot conceptualize what is hap-
pening to him 13 or because an outbreatc of anger could elicit adult re-
MURRAY A. STRAUS, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICAN FAMILIES 5,7,9-10 (1994). 
9. See Bitensky, supra, note 1 at 359. 
10. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, adopted, Dec. 10, 1984, arts. 1(1), 16(1), S. TREATY Doc. 
No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention] (entered into 
force for the United States Nov. 20, 1994). For example, article 1(1) of the Torture 
Convention provides, in pertinent part, that "the term 'torture' means any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person." [d. at art. 1(1) (emphasis added). 
11. See PETER NEWELL, CHILDREN ARE PEOPLE Too: THE CASE AGAINST PHYSICAL 
PUNISHMENT 19 (1989); NANCY SAMALIN, LOVING YOUR CHILD IS NOT ENOUGH: 
POSITIVE DISCIPLINE THAT WORKS 74 (1987); STRAUS, supra note 8, at 100. 
12. See JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 73-74 
(1979); ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GoOD: HIDDEN CRUELTY IN CHILD-REARING 
AND THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE 17 (1990); NEWELL, supra note II, at 12; WILLIAM SEARS 
& MARTHA SEARS, THE DISCIPLINE BOOK: EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNow TO HAVE 
A BETTER-BEHAVED CHILD - FROM BIRTH TO AGE TEN 152 (1995). 
13. See GREVEN, supra note 8, at 19; J. KONRAD STETTBACHER, MAKING SENSE OF 
SUFFERING: THE HEALING CONFRONTATION WITH YOUR OWN PAST 28 (1991); Dean M. 
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taliation. 14 The anger is then later expressed when it is "safe" in the 
form of self-destructiveness and/or destructiveness towards others. 
Thus, spanking may cause children to experience such inward-turning 
d d · 15 . hd 116 . 17 d . 18 syn romes as epresslOn, WIt rawa, anxIety, an tenslOn. 
Spanking may also cause children to exhibit such outward-turning syn-
dromes as aggressiveness,19 antisocial behavior,zo and decreased em-
pathy for others.21 Corporal punishment can also induce physiological 
responses such as headaches and stomachaches,22 and is often a ~relude 
to more severe child abuse with attendant physiological injuries. 3 
However, some of the most ominous ramifications of corporal 
punishment of children are manifested when children who have felt the 
rod reach adulthood. Analysis by respected psychologists as well as 
recent neurobiological studies24 reveals that spanking a child is all too. 
Herman, A Statutory Proposal to Prohibit the Infliction of Violence upon Children. 19 
FAML.Q. 1.21 (1985). 
14. See GREVEN, supra note 8, at 123; PENELOPE LEACH, YOUR GROWING CHILD: 
FROM BABYHOOD THROUGH ADOLESCENCE 224 (1996); ALICE MILLER, BREAKING 
DOWN THE WALL OF SILENCE 55 (Simon Worrall trans., Dutton Books 1991). 
15. See IRWIN A. HYMAN, READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK: THE 
ApPALLING STORY OF PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 43 
(1990); ALICE MILLER, THE DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD 43 (1994); NEWELL, supra 
note 11, at 46. 
16. See GREVEN, supra note 8, at 350; HYMAN, supra note 15, at 94, 100; SEARS & 
SEARS, supra note 12, at 148, 152. 
17. See GREVEN, supra note 8, at 122-23; HYMAN, supra note 15, at 94, 99-100. 
18. See HYMAN, supra note 15, at 945, 100; cf Herman, supra note l3, at 39 (as-
serting that spanking induces compliance by children due to fear oftheir parents). 
19. See LEACH, supra note 14, at 224; SEARS & SEARS, supra note 12, at 154; 
STRAUS, supra note 8, at 22, 100; FELICITY DE ZULUETA, FROM PAIN TO VIOLENCE: THE 
TRAUMATIC ROOTS OF DESTRUCTIVENESS 218 (1993). 
20. See Murray A. Straus et aI., Spanking by Parents and Subsequent Antisocial 
Behavior of Children. 151 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 764-67 
(1997). 
21. See GREVEN, supra note 8, at 127-29; Norma D. Feshbach, The Effects of Vio-
lence in Childhood. 2 1. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 28, 30 (1973); see also MILLER, 
supra note 14, at 88 (describing how physical punishment by his parents during ·child-
hood was a factor contributing to Hitler's later callousness). 
22. See HYMAN, supra note 15, at 95, 100. 
23. See NEWELL, supra note 11, at 21-31; STRAUS, supra note 8, at 81-87, 90-97; 
DAVID A. WOLFE, CHILD ABUSE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 51 (Developmental Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry Series No. 
10, 1987). 
24. For descriptions of the findings of such studies, see ROBIN KARR-MoRSE & 
MEREDITH S. WILEY, GHOSTS FROM THE NURSERY: TRACING THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE 
33-45 (1997). 
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likely to produce an adult with lasting psychic misery and maiming. As 
the psychologist Alice Miller has explained: 
What becomes of this forbidden and therefore unexpressed anger? 
Unfortunately, it does not disappear, but is transformed with time 
.into a more or less conscious hatred directed against either the self 
or substitute persons, a hatred that will seek to discharge itself in 
various ways permissible and suitable for an adult. 25 
A correlation has been drawn, for instance, linking corporal pun-
ishment to such self-destructive adult disorders as depression,26 obses-
sive-compulsive behavior,27 dissociation,28 and paranoia.29 The same 
correlation has been found with respect to adult disorders that are de-
structive of others, such as aggressiveness,3o authoritarianism,31 and 
lack of empathy.32 Obviously, some of these disorders have implica-
tions for society at large, as well as for the mental health of the individ-
ual who has been spanked. Aggressiveness, authoritarianism, and lack 
of empathy are the very personality traits that enable tyrants to tyran-
nize, and that allow millions of people to acquiesce in, or abet crimes 
against, humanity. Thus, spanking is a human rights issue in itself, and 
also because spanking creates the later predisposition to perpetrate hu-
man rights violations on a societal scale. 
The third reason why corporal punishment implicates human 
rights concerns is because subjecting children to violence against which 
adults are protected is patently unfair as unequal treatment. To refer 
back to my opening hypothetical, if your beloved impaired adult neigh-
bor misbehaved, there is little chance that you would swat him to cor-
25. MILLER, supra note 12, at 61. 
, 26. See GREVEN, supra note 8, at 130-35; STRAUS, supra note 8, at 67-79; Hennan, 
supra note 13, at 39. 
27. See GREVEN, supra note 8, at 135-41. 
28. See GREVEN, supra note 8, at 148-68; cf. MILLER, supra note 15, at 30-38 (not-
ing that if a child is compelled to follow parental dictates that do not serve the child's 
needs, the child may split feelings of need from the rest of his or her psyche and sub-
merge such feelings). 
29. See GREVEN, supra note 8, at 168-74; cf. MILLER, supra, note 14, at 86-87, 108-
09, III (suggesting that paranoia, such as that exhibited by Adolf Hitler and Nicolae 
Ceausescu, may be caused by childhood beatings). 
30. See GREVEN, supra note 8, at 126-67; MILLER, supra, note 12, at 61, 65-66, 115-
17, 172; Hennan, supra note 13, at 36. 
31. See GREVEN, supra note 8, at 198-204; see also MILLER, supra, note 14, at 84-
85; NEWELL, supra note 11, at 46. 
32. See GREVEN, supra note 8, at 127-29; MILLER, supra note 12, at 79-83, 115. 
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rect his conduct. Your revulsion at such a course has its roots not only 
in common decency, but also in our laws. Every state has laws crimi-
nalizing assault and battery ,33 reflecting that society has repudiated 
swatting as a behavior modification or dispute resolution technique as 
between adults. Why should that moral standard change simply because 
the person on the receiving end is a child who is a student or our own 
flesh and blood? In light of children's vulnerability and dependency on 
their parents and teachers, subjecting one's own children or pupils to 
violence, and the dread of violence, is perhaps even less defensible than 
subjecting anyone else to such practices. 
The reason why this disparate treatment has evolved may result 
from an antecedent and even more basic inequity in the way we view 
children. When parents spank children, they, unwittingly or not, pre-
sume that they own the children; otherwise, they would not feel free to 
do to their children that which cannot be done to people who are not 
"owned," i.e., physically attack the children.34 The notion that anyone 
can be another's property is, of course, repugnant to basic human rights 
norms. It is telling that as historically oppressed peoples have liberated 
themselves from being legally categorized as the property of others, 
such liberation typically has engendered legal protection from physical 
chastisement. With the emancipation of confederate slaves, Caucasians 
could no longer legally beat African-Americans.35 Likewise, American 
women ultimately achieved reform such that husbands could no longer 
legally beat their wives.36 Perhaps if children were no longer regarded 
as parental chattel, they too would soon be spared the rod. 
Because corporal punishment of children is a human rights issue, 
it should come as no surprise that international human rights law pro-
hibits spanking children. Indeed, a number of the most revered human 
rights treaties and declarations have been authoritatively interpreted to 
this effect. The United States is not a party to several of these human 
33. See Bitensky, supra note I, at 435 & n.407. 
34. See id. at 438-39. 
35. See Stephen Nissenbaum, Lighting the Freedom Tree, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 
1996, at A17. (stating that "many abolitionists, loathing all forms of physical bondage 
and abuse of the powerless, also fought to end corporal punishment . . . [E]ducational 
reformers viewed the whipping of children in schools and at home as similar to the 
lashing of slaves."). For additional descriptions of the lashing of slaves, see JOHN W. 
BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 
251 (1979). 
36. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 129 (1989); Fran-
ces E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family. 18 U. MICH. lL. REFORM 
835,839-40,853-54 (1985). 
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rights conventions and in those conventions to which the United States 
is a party, there are complex issues of enforceability. 
Assuming a worst-case scenario, that we are not bound to enforce, 
domestically, any of the relevant international laws, do we not ignore 
the international consensus at our peril? If the principle has been estab-
lished in the international arena that spanking is a human rights viola-
tion, this principle should at least be taken into account if the United 
States is to formulate a position on this matter that is well considered 
and empirically sound. Certainly, the United States, as a self-
proclaimed champion of human rights in other countries, owes it to our 
children to make policy on this matter that conforms to human rights 
laws, regardless of whether we consider ourselves legally obligated to 
follow those laws. 
The strongest pronouncements on this subject may be found in the 
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (Committee).37 The Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child is the body officially designated to 
monitor compliance with the Convention and, in so doing, issues 
authoritative interpretations of its provisions.38 The Committee has 
taken the position that the Children's Convention as a whole is incon-
sistent with corporal punishment of children.39 In fact, the Children's 
Convention contains at least eight specific provisions that are inconsis-
tent with spanking. For example, Article 19, paragraph 1 states, in part, 
that nations must take "all appropriate legislative, administrative, social 
and educational measures to proU~ct the child from all forms of physical 
or mental violence ... while in the care of parent(s), ... or any other 
person who has the care of the child.,,4o That Article 19 prohibits 
spanking would seem evident as a semantic matter since the provision 
requires nations to protect children from "all forms of physical . . . 
37. U.N. Convention on the Rts. of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44125, U.N. 
GAOR, 44th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. AlRES/44125 (1989) [hereinafter Children's Con-
vention]. 
38. See Cynthia Price Cohen, A Guide to Linguistic Interpretation of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child: Articles I, 4, 41 and 45, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: 
U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAW 
33,33 (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A. Davidson cds., 1990). 
39. See Report on the Seventh Session, U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, Annex 
4, at 63, U.N. Doc. CRCIC/34 (Nov. 1994); see also Bitensky, supra note I, at 392 & 
n.193. 
40. Children's Convention, supra note 37, art. 19(1), at 10. 
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violence.'''' 1 The Committee on the Rights of the Child sees it this way 
as well.42 
The Committee has also repeatedly relied on Articles 28 and 37 of 
the Children's Convention as a basis for criticizing countries that have 
not repudiated corporal punishment of children. Article 37, paragraph 
(a) provides, in part, that, "States Parties shall ensure that no child shall 
be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. ,,43 Marta Santos Pais, a former rapporteur of the Com-
mittee, has explained that it is too narrow a reading of Article 37 to 
identify torture only with "extremely serious and massive cases."44 She 
noted that torture undoubtedly might include "a disciplinary measure 
[that] may be degrading or inhuman.,,45 
Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Children's Convention provides 
that, "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that 
school discipline is administered in a manner consistent with the child's 
human dignity and in conformity with the present Convention.''''6 The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has read Article 28, paragraph 2 
as requiring nations to take measures proscribing corporal punishment 
in the schools.47 Such a reading ensures that school discipline is "in 
conformity with the ... Convention" because other parts of the Con-
41. See Bitensky, supra note I, at 394. 
42. See, e.g., General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Periodic 
Reports to Be Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44, Paragraph l(b), of the 
Convention, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 343d mtg., U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/58 (1996); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child: Zimbabwe, 12th Sess., ~ 18, U.N. Doc. CRC/CII5/Add. 55 (1996) [hereinafter 
Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe]; Concluding Observations of the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child: Sri Lanka, 9th Sess., ~~ 15,32, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add. 
40 (1995); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Can-
ada, 9th Sess., ~~ 14,25, U.N. Doc. CRC/CIl5/Add. 37 (1995) [hereinafter Conclud-
ing Observations on Canada]; Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child: United Kingdom oj Great Britain and Northern lreland, 8th Sess., 
~ 31, U.N. Doc. CRC/CIl5/Add. 34 (1995) [hereinafter Concluding Observations on 
the United Kingdom]. 
43. Children's Convention, supra note 37, art. 37(a), at 17. 
44. Marta Santos Pais, Address at the International Seminar on Worldwide Strate-
gies and Progress Towards Ending All Physical Punishment of Children (Dublin, Ire-
land, Aug. 22, 1996) (transcript on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform). 
45. [d. 
46. Children's Convention, supra note 37, art. 28(2), at 14. 
47. See Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe, supra note 42, at ~ 18; Concluding 
Observations on Canada, supra note 42, at ~ 25; Concluding Observations on the 
United Kingdom, supra note 42,at ~ 31 .. 
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vention outlaw corporal punishment of children.48 Such a reading also 
is "consistent with the child's human dignity," since being physically 
attacked as a matter of right reduces the child to chattel, a subhuman 
h "h I d ·49 status t at IS m erent y emeanmg. 
Article 28, paragraph 2 is not the only provision of the Children's 
Convention protective of the child's dignity. For example, the preamble 
to the Children's Convention extols "the inherent dignity ... of the 
human person,,,50 and the need for children to be raised "in the spirit of 
... dignity.,,51 Judith Karp, Chair of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, categorically stated that, "Physical punishment is a form of vio-
lation of the human dignity of the child.,,52 
In addition to finding a ban on corporal punishment in Articles 19, 
28, and 37, and in the provisions on dignity, the Committee has located 
the ban in at least three other provisions of the Children's Convention 
as well. 53 First, the right to be free of corporal punishment is protected 
by the Convention's nondiscrimination principle in Article 2, paragraph 
1.54 The idea is that the principle forbids justifying corporal punishment 
of children simply because they hold the status of children.55 Second, 
the Committee has advised that spanking is barred by the insistence on 
the primacy of the best interests of the child in Article 3, paragraph 1 of 
the Children's Convention.56 Third, the Committee has also discerned a 
48. See Bitensky, supra note 1, at 397. 
49. Cf. id. at 398 (stating that corporal punishment of children is inconsistent with 
human dignity). 
50. ~hildren's Convention, supra note 37, preamble. 
5!. [d. 
52. Judith Karp, Address at the International Seminar on Ending All Physical Pun-
ishment of Children in Europe (Barcelona, Spain, Oct. 19, 1997) (transcript on file with 
the author). 
53. See Bitensky, supra note 1, at 398. 
54 .. The principle is that "States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth 
in the present Convention to each child ... without discrimination of any kind, irre-
spective of the child's ... status." Children's Convention, supra note 37, art. 2(1), at 5. 
55. See Bitensky, supra note 1, at 398-99; see also Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Nepal, 12th Sess. 11 19, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add. 57 (1996) [hereinafter Concluding Observations on Nepal]; Conclud-
ing Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Senegal, 10th Sess. 11 
24, U.N. Doc. CRC/CIl5/Add. 44 (1995) [hereinafter Concluding Observations on 
Senegal]; Santos Pais, supra note 44. 
56. The provision states that "[i]n all actions concerning children, whether under-
taken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary con-
sideration." Children's Convention, supra note 37, art. 3(1), at 5. The Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has repeatedly taken the position that article 3~ paragraph 1 implic-
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prohibition on corporal punishment in the assurance of Article 12, 
paragraph 1 that the child should be allowed to participate in all matters 
affecting his or her life. 57 Ms. Santos Pais elucidated that participation 
implies dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution, thereby excluding 
violent solutions to family differences.58 
The Children's Convention was not woven from whole cloth, but 
rather, builds upon and elaborates protections for children who are 
contained in earlier international human rights instruments. The Uni-
versalDeclaration of Human Rights,59 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,60 and the American Convention on Human 
Rights61 have also been authoritatively construed to ban corporal pun-
ishment of children. Scholars have found the ban to exist implicitly in 
provisions of these instruments protecting human dignity,62 personal 
.63 d · 64 secunty, an pnvacy. 
itly forbids spanking. See Concluding Observations on Senegal, supra note 55 at ~ 24; 
Concluding Observations on Canada, supra note 43, at ~ 25; Concluding Observa-
tions on the United Kingdom, supra note 42, at ~ 31; see also Santos Pais, supra note 
44. 
57. The provision state that, "States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable 
of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters 
affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with 
the age and maturity of the child." Children's Convention, supra note 37, art. 12(1), at 
8. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has construed article 12, paragraph 1 as 
prohibitive of corporal punishment of children. See Concluding Observations on Sene-
gal, supra note 55, at ~ 24. 
58. See also Santos Pais, supra note 44. 
59. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., pt. I, U.N. Doc. N8I 0, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. 
60. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rts., opened for signature Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1967) (ratified by the United 
States on June 8, 1992, see UNITED NATIONS MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED 
WITH THE SECRETARy-GENERAL: STATUS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1995, at 198 (1996)) 
[hereinafter Civil and Political Rights Covenant]. 
61. American Convention on Hum. Rts., done on Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 
(entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention]. 
62. The Universal Declaration provides that "[a]1I human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights." Universal Declaration, supra note 59, art. I. The American 
Convention states that "[e]veryone has the right to have ... his dignity recognized." 
American Convention, supra note 61, art. II (1), at 148. For interpretations that these 
provisions may be construed to outlaw corporal punishment of children, see Bitensky, 
supra note I, at 404; Santos Pais, supra note 44. 
63. The Universal Declaration protects "security of person." Universal Declaration, 
supra note 59, art. 3, at 72. The same guarantee appears in the Civil and Political 
Rights Covenant. Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 60, art. 9(1), at 175. 
It is included as well in the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights 
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Although the ban on corporal punishment of children is, therefore, 
firmly established in international human rights law, it also is not accu-
rate to say that every provision of every document bearing on the sub-
ject gives rise to an absolute prohibition. For example, Article 7 of the 
Civil and Political Rights Covenant, which forbids torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,65 has been interpreted 
to extend only to excessive physical chastisement.66 The European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms contains a similar provision at Article 3.67 On September 23, 
1998, the European Court of Human Rights issued a ruling in A v. The 
United Kingdom,68 that had the effect of limiting Article 3's applicabil-
ity only to corporal punishment that attains a minimum level of sever-
ity.69 
and Fundamental Freedoms, done on Nov. 4, 1950, art. 5(1), at 226,213 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter European Convention]. The American Convention contains similar lan-
guage to the effect that "[e]very person has the right to have his physical, mental, and 
moral integrity respected." American Convention, supra note 61, art. 5(1), at 146. For 
interpretations that these provisions establish children's right to be free of corporal 
punishment; see Bitensky, supra note 1, at 412; Cynthia Price Cohen, Freedom from 
Corporal Punishment: One of the Human Rights of Children, N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 
95,119 (1984); Santos Pais, supra note 44. 
64. American Convention, supra note 61, art. 11 (2)-(3), at 148 (stating that "[n]o 
one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life [or] his 
family" . and that "[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference"); Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 60, art. 17(1) - (2), at 
177 (providing that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his privacy [or] family" and that "[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the 
law against such interference"); Universal Declaration, supra note 59, art. 12, at 73 
(asserting that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy [or] 
family"). For interpretations that these provisions protect children from corporal pun-
ishment, see GERALDINE V AN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF THE 
CHILD251 (International Studies in Human Rights Vol. 35, 1995); Bitensky, supra note 
l,at412. 
65. Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 60, art. 7, at 175. 
66. See Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 
20, ~~ 2,5, U.N. Doc. HRUGEN/llRev. 2 (1996) (intimating that article 7 of the Civil 
and Political Rights Covenant proscribes excessive corporal punishment). 
67. European Convention, supra note 63, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224 (stating that 
"[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment"). 
68. A v. The United Kingdom, 1998 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (visited 
Apr. 11, 1999) <http://www.dhcour.coeJr/>. 
69. See id. 
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The case arose when an adult hit his nine-year-old ste.gson's but-
tocks and legs with a stick so as to cause bruises and welts. 0 The step-
father was charged with assault under English law.71 His defense was 
that the caning constituted reasonable corporal punishment of a very 
difficult boy.72 After a jury acquitted the stepfather/3 the boy sought 
relief from the European Human Rights Court, alleging, among other 
things, that Britain's legitimization of this corporal punishment, 
through the acquittal, violated Article 3 of the European Convention.74 
The European Court ruled that the government violated the Convention 
because the caning in this case reached the minimum level of severity 
prohibited by Article 3.75 
While A v. The United Kingdom means that, as of yet, Article 3 of 
the European Convention does not outlaw all spanking, the decision 
does represent some grudging progress in the direction of a total ban. It 
is the first time that the European Court has held that parental, in addi-
tion to scholastic76 or judicially mandated,77 corporal punishment 
comes within the purview of Article 3. Also, the court found that a 
spanking accepted by an English jury as reasonable violates Article 3, 
indicating that the level of severity required to violate that provision 
may not be great. 
Interpretations of Article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Cove-
nant, and Article 3 of the European Convention must, however, be put 
in context. The interpretations are of a single provision appearing in 
two treaties. They do not change the fact that other provisions of inter-
national human rights instruments, and especially of the Children's 
Convention, are understood to outlaw all corporal punishment of chil-
dren. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. See id. 
75. See id. 
76. See, e.g., Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
(Eur. Ct. of H.R.) 172, 172-74 (5-4 decision) (ruling that a headmaster did not violate 
article 3 of the European Convention by hitting a seven-year-old student three times on 
his clothed buttocks with a rubber-soled gym shoe, but observing that a school-
administered punishment that does not have any severe or long-lasting effects could 
still fall within the ambit of article 3). 
77. See, e.g., Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6-9, 17 (1978) 
(holding that when authorities inflicted a judicially mandated birching on a fifteen-
year-old, they violated article 3 of the European Convention). 
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Of course, announcing exalted principles of human rights law is 
one thing; making practical applications of those principles is quite 
another. Can the international law principle against spanking realisti-
cally be transformed into national policy and practice? The Committee 
on the Rights of the Child clearly thinks SO.78 It has urged nations to 
engage in education campaigns against corporal punishment of children 
and to enac~ legislation prohibiting such punishment.79 Lest the latter 
recommendation should appear unworkable or outlandish, it should be 
noted that eight nations have already enacted statutes against all corpo-
ral punishment of children, and one nation has achieved the same end 
by judicial decision. Sweden led the way with a statute adopted in 
1979.80 Finland,8! Norway,82 Austria,83 and Cyprus84 followed with 
78. See U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, supra note 39. 
79. [d. 
80. Sweden's statute provides as follows: "Children are entitled to care, security and 
a good upbringing. They shall be treated with respect for their person and their distinc-
tive character and may not be subject to corporal punishment or any other humiliating 
treatment." 6 kap. I § f<iriildrabalken (Swed.) [Swedish Children and Parents Code ch. 
6, § I] (Swedish Ministry of Justice trans.). 
81. The Finnish law states that, "[a] child shall be brought up with understanding, 
security and gentleness. He shall not be subdued, corporally punished or otherwise 
humiliated. The growth of a child towards independence, responsibility and adulthood 
shall be supported and encouraged." Laki lapsen huollosta ja tapaamisoikeudesta, 1 
luku, I §, 3 mom. [Finnish Child Custody and Right of Access Act, ch. I, § I, subsec. 
3] (Finnish Dep't of Legislation, Ministry of Justice trans.) 
82. Norway's enactment states that "[t]he child shall not be exposed to physical 
violence or to treatment which can threaten his physical or mental health." Endring i 
1987 av barnelovens § 30,3. ledd (Lov av 6. februar 1987 nr II om endring i barne-
loven § 30) [Norwegian Parent and Child Act art. 30, § 3, as amended by the Amend-
ing Act. no. II, Feb. 6, 1987] (Finn Erik Engzelius trans.). 
83. The Austrian statute provides as follows: 'The minor child must follow the 
parents' orders. In their orders and in the implementation thereof, parents must consider 
the age, development and personality of the child; the use of force and infliction of 
physical or psychological harm are not permitted." § 146a ABGB [Austrian Civil 
Code § 146a] (Berlitz Translation Services trans.). 
84. The Cypriot law not only forbids parental use of any force against children, but 
also makes it an offense even for violent behavior to take place in the presence of chil-
dren. Cyprus' statute provides, in part, as follows: 
3.1 (1) For purposes of this Law violence means any unlawful act or controlling 
behavior which results in direct actual physical, sexual or psychological injury to any 
member of the family and includes violence used for purposes of sexual intercourse 
without the consent of the victim as well as for [the] purPose of restricting its liberty . 
. . . . (3) Any act or behavior constituting violence within the meaning of subsections 
(1) and (2) above or constituting an offense under sections 174, 175 and 177 of the 
Criminal Code, if it takes place in the presence of minor members of the family shall be 
considered as violence exercised against the said minor members of the family likely to 
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their own enactments during the 1980s. Italy's Supreme Court of Cas-
sazione issued a ruling ending corporal punishment of children in that 
country in 1996.85 Denmark, improving upon an earlier law discourag-
ing spanking,86 enacted an outright prohibition in 1997.87 And, in 1998, 
Latvia and Croatia also joined the anti-spanking c1ub.88 
The actions taken above all come from Europe, and Europeans are 
different, aren't they? In Europe they serve their children wine at din-
ner, take six-week vacations, and think capital punishment is barbaric. 
But, the last I heard, Minnesota is not part of Europe. America's best-
kept secret is that Minnesota also prohibits all corporal punishment of 
children.89 This fact is not widely known because, unlike its European 
counterparts, Minnesota does not have a single statute that explicitly 
forbids spanking. Instead, the state's ban must be teased out of several 
statutory provisions which, when read together, reveal that corporal 
cause them psychological injury and such act or behavior constitutes an offense 
punishable under subsection (4) of this section. Act of June 17, 1997, Law 147(1), at 
33(1), (3), OFFICIAL GAZEITE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS No. 2886 (Leonidas 
Markides, Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus trans.) 
85. Cambria, Cass., sez. VI, 18 marzo 1996 [Supreme Court of Cassation, 6th Penal 
Section, Mar. 18,1996], Foro It. II 1996,407 (Italy) (Translation by Triangle Transla-
tions on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). According to 
Judge Ippolito, who authored the opinion on behalf of the Italian Supreme Court, the 
judges "considered the case as an opportunity to establish the legal principle that par-
ents in Italy are absolutely forbidden from using any violence or corporal punishment 
to correct their children's conduct." Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, Judge of 
the Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Republica Italiana, in Rome, Italy (June 11, 1996). 
86. The earlier Danish statute stated that "[p]arental custody implies the obligation 
to protect the child against physical and psychological violence and against other harm-
ful treatment." Lov nr. 387 af 14. juni 1995 om foraeldremyndighed og samvaer, jf. § 
2, stk. 2 [Danish Act on Parental Custody and Conviviality no. 387, § 2, subsec. 2 
(June 14, 1995)] (revision of 1985 law) (Kromann & MUnter trans.), quoted in 
NEWELL, supra note 11, at 91. 
87. The most recent Danish legislation on the subject of corporal punishment of 
children provides that "[t]he child has the right to care and security. It shall be treated 
with respect for its personality and may not be subjected to corporal punishment or any 
other offensive treatment." Lov nr. 416 om aendring af lov om foraeldremyndighed og 
samvaer § I [Danish Act to Amend the Act on Parental Custody and Conviviality no. 
416, § 1] (Kromann & MUnter trans.). 
88. See Latvia and Croatia Join the Abolitionist States, EPOCH WORLDWIDE 
(EPOCH-WORLDWIDE, London, England), Nov. 1998, at 2 (newsletter is on file with 
the author.) 
89. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.06, subd. 1(6) (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 609.379, subd. I(a) (West 1978 & Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.379, subd. 
2 (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.224, subds. 1(1)-(2) (West 1987); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02, subd. 7 (West Supp. 1997). 
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punishment of children is considered an assault rather than a defense to 
assault charges as in other American jurisdictions.90 
In sum, corporal punishment of children has all of the attributes of 
a gross human rights violation and is treated as such by international 
law. A trend has been evolving, especially in Europe, to make this in- . 
ternational law principle operative at the national level. Obviously, 
when spanking is prohibited by law and becomes socially unacceptable, 
our children are spared fear-ridden, hurtful childhoods. Perhaps less 
obviously, but no less importantly, when spanking is abolished, the 
prospects for human rights in general become immeasurably brighter. 
We have it within our reach to humanize our species' psychological 
evolution and societal progress through nonviolent child-rearing. With 
the eradication of physical coercion as a child-rearing technique, future 
adults will not be as aggressive, authoritarian, or lacking in empathy. 
Our descendants will then be poised for an epochal psychological 
breakthrough: at last the human psyche will be free to shun the tyranny, 
cruelty, and crimes against humanity that have plagued past millennia. 
That is an empowering and stunning thought. It is an aspiration that 
should be a top priority for the twenty-first century. 
90. [d. The Minnesota statutes referred to above remove corporal punishment of 
children as a parental defense to assault charges. For a full description and analysis of 
these statutes, see Bitensky, supra note I, at 386-88. 
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